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Abstract
This contribution adds a new perspective to the debate on electoral integrity by asking how 
electoral integrity affects the way in which election results translate into citizen attitudes 
towards the political system. It introduces a causal mechanism that links political losing to 
political trust via evaluations of electoral fairness: citizens who voted for the losing camp 
are more likely to view the electoral process as unfair than citizens who voted for the win-
ning camp, resulting in political distrust. It further suggests that the effects of political los-
ing on political trust depend on the level of electoral integrity. In conditions where the 
elections were conducted in a free and fair manner, even those who voted for the losing 
camp have little reason to suspect foul play and therefore political losing should barely 
affect perceptions of the electoral process. Whenever there are actual indications of elec-
toral malpractice, however, political losers have much more reason to doubt the integrity 
of the electoral process than those who are content with the outcome of the election. The 
contribution makes use of a unique dataset that ex-post harmonizes survey data from three 
cross-national survey projects (Asian Barometer Survey, European Social Survey, Lat-
inobarómetro) and macro-level data from the Varieties-of-Democracy Project to cover 45 
democracies in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America. Using multi-level modeling, it finds 
that political losing indeed decreases political trust indirectly via perceptions of electoral 
fairness. Confirming its key proposition, the empirical analysis shows that political losing 
has a weaker effect on political trust in countries where electoral integrity is high.
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Electoral integrity is increasingly becoming the topic of both the public debate and 
political-science research. Typically defined as “agreed upon international conventions 
and universal standards about elections reflecting global norms applying to all countries 
worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the pre-electoral period, the 
campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath,” (Norris 2014, p. 21) electoral integrity lies 
at the core of democratic procedures. Deficits in electoral integrity can take many forms, 
such as gerrymandering, media bias, or voter intimidation (cf. Birch 2011; Lehoucq 
2003; Norris et  al. 2013). While such deficits are ubiquitous in autocracies—where a 
lack of electoral integrity is a defining criterion—we find them also in democracies. 
For example, authorities in the US are repeatedly confronted with complaints about 
voter suppression laws targeting minority voters (Hajnal et al. 2017; Wang 2012), and 
German Bundestag elections display signs of irregularities in vote counting (Breunig 
and Goerres 2011). A recent series of books and other contributions has extensively 
discussed what causes such deficits (Birch 2007; Lehoucq 2003; Norris 2015), how to 
detect and measure them (Birch 2011; Bishop and Hoeffler 2016; Hyde and Marinov 
2012; Kelley and Kolev 2010; Norris et al. 2013, 2014b; van Ham 2014), how to pro-
mote electoral integrity (Birch 2011; Kelley 2012; Norris 2017; Norris et  al. 2014a), 
and why electoral integrity matters (Norris 2014). With respect to the latter question, 
prior research has studied how violations of electoral integrity can deter voter turnout 
(Bratton 2008; Martínez i Coma and Trinh 2017; Simpser 2012), lead to post-election 
violence and even civil war (Norris 2014), and damage the legitimacy of political 
regimes (Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2017; McAllister and White 2014; Norris 2014). This 
paper adds a new perspective to this literature by asking how electoral integrity affects 
the way election results translate into citizen attitudes towards the political system.
Traditionally, research connecting election results with citizens’ attitudes focusses on 
a direct link between voting for the winning or losing camp and citizen support. Most 
immediately, those who have voted for the parties or candidates that ended up in govern-
ment (i.e. those on the winning side) should ceteris paribus be more satisfied with this 
incumbent government than those who have voted for opposition parties or candidates 
(i.e. those on the losing side) since this government is more likely to implement policies 
favored by those who voted for it (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Lambert et al. 1986). 
In addition to this utilitarian perspective, which aims primarily at the link between elec-
tion results and incumbent support, Anderson et al. (2005) argue that winning or losing 
in an election may also affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and their trust in the 
political system. For one, winning or losing may trigger positive or negative emotions, 
which are then conveyed onto not only the incumbent government but also onto the 
political system itself. Second, assuming a need for cognitive consistency (cf. Festinger 
1957), Anderson et  al. (2005) argue that electoral losers may develop more negative 
attitudes towards the political system to avoid psychological discomfort and cognitive 
dissonance. Lending support to these arguments, prior research has repeatedly found the 
status as election loser (winner) to decrease (increase) support for the political regime, 
especially citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and their trust in various political insti-
tutions (Anderson et  al. 2005; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 
2002; Banducci and Karp 2003; Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Blais and Gelineau 2007; 
Craig et  al. 2006; Curini et  al. 2012; Dahlberg and Linde 2017; Jou 2009; Moehler 
2009; Rich 2015; Singh et al. 2011).
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This contribution seeks to expand on this research by bringing in the electoral process. 
It does so by first introducing a causal mechanism that links political losing to political 
trust via evaluations of the electoral process: citizens who voted for the losing camp are 
more likely to view the electoral process as unfair than citizens who voted for the winning 
camp, leading to political distrust. It further suggests that the effects of political losing on 
political trust are contingent on the actual quality of the electoral process: in conditions 
where electoral integrity is high and elections are conducted in a truly free and fair manner, 
even those who voted for the losing camp have little reason to suspect foul play. Political 
losing should therefore barely affect perceptions of electoral fairness. Yet whenever there 
are actual deficits in electoral integrity, political losers have much more reason to doubt 
the integrity of the electoral process than those who are content with the outcome of the 
election.
Empirically, this contribution relies on a unique database that combines survey data on 
political trust and perceptions of electoral fairness from three cross-national survey projects 
(Asian Barometer Survey, European Social Survey, Latinobarómetro) with macro-level 
data on electoral integrity (Varieties-of-Democracy Project) through ex-post harmoniza-
tion. Covering 45 democracies across three continents (Europe, Asia, and Latin America), 
it uses multi-level structural equation modeling to test its conjectures on a comprehensive 
scale. It finds that political losing indeed decreases political trust and that it does so not 
directly but indirectly via perceptions of electoral fairness and satisfaction with the incum-
bent government. Confirming its key proposition, the empirical analysis shows that politi-
cal losing has a weaker effect on political trust in countries where elections are found to be 
conducted in a truly free and fair manner.
2  Political losing, electoral integrity, and political trust
Political trust, defined as citizens’ confidence that the political system, its institutions, or 
actors will “do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 
1990, p. 358), is a core concept in political-culture research and considered as essential 
for the smooth functioning and stability of democracy. Not only is it often referred to as 
a key component or even the epitome of regime legitimacy (Hetherington 1998; Hutch-
ison and Johnson 2011; Newton 2009), but it also has important and desirable behavioural 
consequences. Among others, high political trust is associated with a higher willingness 
to pay taxes (Letki 2006; Marien and Hooghe 2011; Scholz and Lubell 1998), higher com-
pliance with the law in general (Abdelzadeh et  al. 2015; Dalton 2004; Tyler 2011), and 
fewer demands for institutional reform (Dalton 2004; Dalton et  al. 2001). Political trust 
makes political institutions work effectively and reduces the need for control and supervi-
sion. Investigating how losing in an election, electoral integrity, and political trust relate to 
each other can thus help us assess under which conditions election results have the most 
profound consequences for the functioning of democracy.
While prior research typically expects losing an election to have a direct effect on political 
trust (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Banducci and Karp 2003; Craig et al. 2006; Jou 2009), I 
propose two causal mechanisms mediating this effect: one via support for the incumbent gov-
ernment and one via perceptions of electoral fairness. Following David Easton’s (1965, 1975) 
conceptualization of political support, we can distinguish between citizen attitudes towards the 
political regime and towards the political authorities (as well as towards the political commu-
nity). First, the most immediate reaction to losing an election should be at the level of support 
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for the incumbent authorities: citizens that did not vote for the incumbent government are 
unlikely to be happy with this government or satisfied with its performance, both for utilitar-
ian and for psychological reasons (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Lambert et al. 1986). Those 
less satisfied with the incumbent government may then generalize these attitudes towards the 
political regime itself—after all, it is incumbents that shape much of how the political system 
is perceived (Lambert et al. 1986; Maier 2011)—, resulting in lower levels of political trust.
H1  Political losing decreases political trust indirectly through satisfaction with the incum-
bent government.
However, losing may also affect political trust through another venue: by shaping citi-
zens’ perceptions of the fairness of the electoral process. Those who have voted for an 
unsuccessful party or candidate have more reason—both for psychological and for utilitar-
ian reasons—to suspect foul play and to scrutinize the election result. For election winners, 
on the other hand, having attained the desired outcome is likely to lead to them paying little 
attention to allegations of electoral irregularities, irrespective of whether these are truthful 
or not. Recurring to the negative emotional response to losing, Cantú and García-Ponce 
(2015) conjecture that election losers develop more critical views about the integrity of 
the electoral process in order to compensate for the gap between their party or candidate 
preferences and the actual outcome of the election. Testing their hypothesis on Mexico, 
they find that election losers indeed perceive the electoral process to have been less fair 
than those who find themselves on the winning side. Kernell and Mullinix (2019) similarly 
argue that what they call “partisan motivated reasoning” distorts information processing 
and interpretation among both winners and losers, resulting in losers viewing the electoral 
process as having been less fair than winners. Conducting a survey experiment in the US, 
they confirm their proposition in finding that losers are more likely to believe that votes 
have been miscounted than winners (as well as nonpartisans). Earlier research on the US 
(Alvarez et al. 2008; Craig et al. 2006), Africa (Moehler 2009), and Latin America (Mal-
donado and Seligson 2014a, b) substantiates the general idea of citizens viewing the elec-
toral process more negatively when the election has not brought their desired outcome.
More negative perceptions of the electoral process should then subsequently decrease trust 
in the political system because (perceived) violations of electoral integrity violate the rules of 
the democratic game and therefore are bound to disappoint citizens’ normative expectations 
of the political system (Norris 2014). In contrast, the perception that the electoral process was 
conducted in a free and fair manner should boost citizen confidence in the political system by 
increasing its perceived accountability and responsiveness, giving citizens the impression that 
they can effectively shape policy outcomes (Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2017; Hooghe and Stiers 
2016). Prior research confirms this assumption. Alemika (2007) shows that trust in political 
institutions is higher if citizens perceive elections to be free and fair in Africa; Rose and Mish-
ler (2009) discover similar effects in Russia; and McAllister and White (2014) find perceptions 
of electoral fairness to increase satisfaction with democracy in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. 
More globally, Norris (2014) demonstrates that citizen trust in elected institutions as well as 
satisfaction with democracy decrease if citizens perceive electoral malpractice to be more 
widespread. Overall, then, political losing should indirectly affect political trust.1
1 Both of these mechanisms should be present in any type of election (parliamentary, presidential, or gen-
eral) whose outcome determines government composition. No matter who exactly gets elected, as long as 
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H2  Political losing decreases political trust indirectly through perceptions of electoral 
fairness.
However, this negative effect of political losing may itself be contingent on the nature of 
the election. In contexts where elections are generally conducted in a free and fair manner 
(i.e. in high-quality liberal democracies), even those who voted for the losing camp should 
still evaluate the electoral process positively, weakening the linkage between political los-
ing and political trust. In contrast, in political regimes where the electoral process is flawed 
to begin with, being on the side of the electoral losers should further skepticism towards 
the electoral process and, in conjunction, greatly reduce political trust. Esaiasson (2011, 
p. 103) argues that losers will “react well” to their defeat under four conditions: first, they 
must perceive to gain utility from a peaceful solution of conflict through electoral pro-
cesses; second, they must feel like being involved in the decision-making process; third, 
they must consider the system of government itself as legitimate; and fourth, losers must 
have the impression that their own preferred party or candidate “has a fair chance to win 
the next time around.”
At least the latter three conditions are all dependent on the integrity of the electoral 
process, suggesting a moderating effect of electoral integrity on the link between politi-
cal losing and political trust. This idea is supported by Maldonado and Seligson (2014a, 
b), who, analyzing up to 23 democracies in Latin America, observe that the gap in politi-
cal trust between winners and losers is indeed smaller in countries with a higher level of 
electoral integrity. Contrastingly, Fortin-Rittberger et al. (2017) find that election winners 
only express more satisfaction with democracy than election losers when elections were 
conducted in an impartial way. At the same time, Esaiasson (2011) as well as Anderson 
et al. (2005) find the winner-loser gap in political support to be smaller in older democra-
cies than in newly established ones. As older democracies ceteris paribus have fewer prob-
lems with the electoral process, these findings may also indicate a moderating effect of 
electoral integrity on the link between political losing and political trust. We can therefore 
hypothesize that the negative effect political losing has on political trust, in particular the 
indirect effect that is mediated through perceptions of electoral fairness  (H2), is mitigated 
by electoral integrity.
H3 The indirect effect of political losing on political trust through perceptions of electoral 
fairness is contingent on electoral integrity.
In contrast, we would not expect the indirect effect that is mediated through satisfac-
tion with the incumbent government  (H1) to be contingent on electoral integrity. The link 
between losing and government satisfaction stems primarily from voters’ expectations that 
a government they did (not) vote for is more (less) likely to implement the policies they 
prefer and there is little reason to expect electoral integrity to affect this relationship.
there is an electoral process that eventually determines the composition of government, there will be win-
ners and losers among the electorate. These winners (losers) will always be more (less) happy with the 
outcome of the elections and thus more (less) satisfied with the government as well as less (more) likely to 




3  Data and measurement
To test these conjectures on a broad geographical scale, this study combines micro-level 
data from three different cross-national survey projects: the Asian Barometer Survey 
(2010–2012; Asian Barometer 2013), the European Social Survey (2012–2013; European 
Social Survey 2016), and the Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 
2014) with macro-level data from the Varieties-of-Democracy Project (v9; Coppedge et al. 
2019b). Together, these data cover 45 democracies spread across Europe, Latin America, 
and Eastern Asia (for a list of countries, see Table 2).2
All survey data underwent a process of ex-post harmonization in order to prepare them 
for use in the comparative analysis. In general, linear transformation was applied so that 
the variables ranged from 0 to 1 and so that high values always meant agreement with the 
respective concept. The formula used for this transformation was
or, in case the direction of the scale had to be reversed,
Table 1 provides an illustration of this linear transformation process. It shows how val-
ues on the source variables (in this case, for measuring trust in institutions) translate into 
values on the target variable.
This approach represents common practice and is considered reasonably valid when 
question wordings and response categories are similar (Veenhoven 1993). Ex-post 
new value =
old value − min value
max value − min value
new value = 1 −
old value − min value
max value − min value
Table 1  Illustration of scale transformation
Source scales Transformed target scale
Asian Barometer European social survey Latinobarómetro












4 (none at all) 0 (no trust at all) 4 (no trust) 0 (no trust)
2 The analysis excludes countries that cannot be classified as even electoral democracies since the meaning 
of “election winner” and “election loser” is fundamentally different in autocratic political regimes.
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harmonization enables us to extend the cross-national coverage of survey data, which 
is often limited to specific groups of countries (e.g., regionally), and therefore increases 
variation and facilitates cross-national comparison (Dubrow and Tomescu-Dubrow 2016). 
Common challenges to ex-post harmonization include the quality of the source data and 
documentation and the comparability of the data (Granda et  al. 2010; Tomescu-Dubrow 
and Slomczynski 2016). The following paragraphs describe in more detail the measures 
used and discuss specific challenges that arose during the harmonization process of the 
data used in this analysis.
The dependent variable political trust is modeled latently as citizens’ confidence in four 
key regime institutions: parliament, legal system, police, and political parties (for question 
wordings, see Table A-1). Modeling the dependent variable latently in a structural equa-
tion model (instead of, for example, using a summative index or factor scores) allows to 
account for the different weight of each of the four indicators as well as for measurement 
error (Meuleman 2019). Institutional confidence is a commonly used measure of political 
trust in both democratic and autocratic contexts (e.g., Chen 2017; Dalton 2004; Hooghe, 
Dassonneville, and Marien 2015; Moehler 2009; Pietsch and Clark 2015). By combining 
confidence in four different institutions, the measure captures institutions of the legislative, 
executive, and judiciary as well as political and implementing institutions. While question 
wordings are rather similar across all three surveys (cf. Table A-1), the number of response 
categories varies considerably: Both the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) and the Latino-
barómetro (LB) use 4 response categories ranging from “a great deal”/“a lot” of trust to 
“none at all,” whereas the European Social Survey (ESS) offers respondents an 11-point 
response scale. Yet, the extremes are labeled similarly to the ones in the ABS and LB: “no 
trust at all” and “complete trust.” It thus seems justified to harmonize them using linear 
transformation (see Table 1 for an illustration of how the original variables translate into 
the target variable). Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis showing metric measure-
ment invariance to be present across surveys further validates this practice: it suggests that 
respondents interpret questions and response scales in similar ways across survey projects 
(for a more detailed discussion of measurement invariance, see Online Appendix/Table 
A-3). To facilitate interpretation, political trust is transformed onto a scale from 0 (no trust 
at all) to 100 (complete trust).
For measuring the status as election loser, the analysis makes use of the retrospective 
vote choice questions. In accordance with the mainstream of the literature (e.g., Anderson 
et al. 2005; Blais et al. 2017; Singh 2014), it codes a respondent as an election “winner” 
whenever they voted for a party that joined the government subsequent to the election in 
question (regardless of the number of vote shares or cabinet seats won by that party) and as 
an election “loser” whenever they voted for a party that did not become part of the govern-
ment.3 The resulting binary variable takes the value “1” for election losers and the value 
3 This information is already included in the Asian Barometer Survey and Latinobarómetro data. For the 
European Social Survey data, Sven Hillen and Miroslav Nemčok were kind enough to provide me with their 
hand-coded data on election winners. Both survey projects as well as Hillen and Nemčok coded as “win-
ner” anyone who voted for a party that ended up in government, regardless of whether this was in a coali-
tion or a single-party government. An alternative operationalization of “winner” and “loser” would be to 
incorporate information on either the vote shares or the share of cabinet seats won by a party. While such a 
more nuanced measure could potentially provide more statistical power, from a theoretical perspective, the 
dichotomous measure seems more appropriate: When it comes to government formation, being on the win-
ning (or losing) side is more of a binary rather than a gradual concept. In addition, using vote shares may 
even lead to counterintuitive results in cases where parties with large vote shares (even pluralities) end up 
being excluded from government.
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“0” for election winners. All countries were checked with regard to whether a national 
election (parliamentary or presidential) was held during the respective survey’s fieldwork 
period. This was the case in the Netherlands, which held national parliamentary elections 
on September 12, 2012, which coincided with the ESS fieldwork period starting in August 
2012. As government was not formed until November 5, winners and losers are almost 
impossible to identify for this period, and the analysis thus excludes the Netherlands. The 
same is true for Israel, where the ESS was fielded between September 2012 and February 
2013 and which held national parliamentary elections on January 22, 2013, taking until 
March 14, 2013, to form a government. No national elections were held in any of the other 
European nor the Asian or Latin American countries during survey fieldwork periods.
To gauge the mediating variable perceptions of electoral fairness, I employ an item 
asking respondents how free and fair they thought the last national election to be. This 
item was not worded identically across the three surveys (cf. Table A-1). Whereas the ABS 
and ESS both ask rather generally about how free and fair respondents think the last elec-
tion was, the LB queries more specifically about the fairness of the election “regarding the 
opportunities of the candidates and parties to campaign.” While the latter refers to only a 
subcomponent of electoral integrity, we may still consider respondents’ replies to this ques-
tion to reflect their overall assessment of the freedom and fairness of the electoral process. 
Prior research has shown that survey respondents often use rather general assessments as 
heuristics when being confronted with survey questions on specialized topics (Tourangeau 
et al. 2000). This seems especially likely in our case since the LB contains no other ques-
tions on different aspects of electoral integrity, so respondents have little incentive to dis-
entangle their perceptions of different aspects of the electoral process. The second media-
tor, satisfaction with the incumbent government, is measured by items asking how satisfied 
respondents are with the current government or its performance. Again, the ABS and ESS 
ask very similar questions, querying how satisfied respondents are with their country’s cur-
rent government, whereas the LB asks whether respondents approved or disapproved of the 
performance of the current government. Given that government performance is likely the 
main evaluation criterion for satisfaction with government, we can assume that either ques-
tion taps into the same latent construct.
For measuring the moderating variable electoral integrity, the analysis relies on macro-
level data from the Varieties-of-Democracy (V-Dem) Project (version 9; Coppedge et al. 
2019b). As a primary and summative measure, it uses V-Dem’s Clean Elections Index. 
The Clean Elections Index gauges the extent to which elections are free from “registration 
fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, 
and election violence” (Coppedge et al. 2019a, p. 44) and thereby captures the most central 
components of electoral integrity. It is composed of indicators for electoral management 
body (EMB) autonomy, EMB capacity, election voter registry, election vote buying, other 
voting irregularities, election government intimidation, other electoral violence, and elec-
tion freedom and fairness.
Based on this measure, we can identify countries and regions with deficits in electoral 
integrity. As Fig. 1 illustrates, V-Dem rates levels of electoral integrity to be universally 
high across Western Europe. However, deficits in electoral integrity become apparent 
already for some of the Eastern European democracies (for example, minor deficits in Lith-
uania and Hungary, and rather major deficits in Albania and Ukraine). The picture looks 
much bleaker for Latin America, where only Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay reach 
top marks in electoral integrity, while countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, or Colom-
bia exhibit what can be considered substantial deficits. In East Asia, already the region 
with the smallest share of democracies, only a single country—Japan—registers virtually 
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no deficits. The magnitude of deficits varies across the remaining East Asian democracies, 
with the Philippines showing particularly low levels of electoral integrity.
Combining the system-level V-Dem data with the individual-level survey data requires 
matching respondents (in the survey data) to country-years (in the V-Dem data). As none 
of the surveys used for this analysis is an election study, fieldwork periods are not aligned 
with election cycles. Yet, as levels of electoral integrity can only be measured in election 
years, for the Clean Elections Index, V-Dem repeats the value for the most recent election 
for all years up until the year in which the next election takes place. This means that we 
can mostly use the year in which the respective survey was fielded to match these system-
level data to the individual-level survey data. Exceptions had to be made for those cases 
in which elections4 took place in the same year in which the survey was fielded. As out-
lined above, whenever elections were held during survey fieldwork periods, these had to 
be excluded from the analysis due to difficulties in identifying election winners and losers. 
Whenever these elections were held after the survey fieldwork period, the matching year 
had to be adjusted: Using the survey year would have implied matching electoral-integrity 
data for the upcoming election, so instead the year preceding the survey fieldwork period 
was used for matching the macro data. Table 2 gives an overview of survey fieldwork peri-
ods, election years/dates, and matching years used.
The models include several control variables. On the individual level, they control for 
other common determinants of political trust: economic performance evaluations (e.g., 
Mishler and Rose 2001), political interest (e.g., Lü 2014), and social trust (e.g., Zmerli and 
Newton 2008). Economic performance evaluations are measured in terms of how respond-
ents evaluate their country’s present economic situation; a question asking respondents 
how interested they are in politics gauges political interest; and respondents’ assessment 
of whether most people can be trusted captures social trust. The analyses also include a 
Fig. 1  Levels of electoral integrity in European, Latin American, and East Asian democracies. Notes: Clean 
Elections Index for respective matching year. Source: V-Dem v9. Maps created with mapchart.net
4 In line with the definition of “winner” and “loser,” i.e. voting for a party that ended up in government or 
not, “elections” always refers to the type of election that determined the composition of government. For 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, this means national legislative elections; for presidential sys-
tems, this means presidential elections.
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Table 2  Fieldwork periods, election dates, and matching years
Fieldwork period Election type Previous election Next election Matching year
European social survey round 6
Albania 12/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2009 23/6/2013 2012
Belgium 9/2012–12/2012 Parliamentary 2010 2014 2012
Bulgaria 2/2013–4/2013 Parliamentary 2009 12/5/2013 2012
Cyprus 9/2012–1/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2016 2012
Czechia 1/2013–3/2013 Parliamentary 2010 25–26/10/2013 2012
Denmark 1/2013–5/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2013
Estonia 9/2012–1/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2012
Finland 9/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2012
France 2/2013–6/2013 Parliamentary 2012 2017 2013
Germany 9/2012–1/2013 Parliamentary 2009 22/9/2013 2012
Hungary 11/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2010 2014 2012
Iceland 10/2012–3/2013 Parliamentary 2009 27/4/2013 2012
Ireland 10/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2016 2012
Israel 9/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 22/1/2013
Italy 5/2013–12/2013 Parliamentary 24–25/2/2013 2018 2013
Lithuania 5/2013–8/2013 Parliamentary 2012 2016 2013
Netherlands 8/2012–3/2013 Parliamentary 12/9/2012
Norway 8/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2009 8–9/9/2013 2012
Poland 9/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2012
Portugal 10/2012–3/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2012
Slovakia 10/2012–3/2013 Parliamentary 10/3/2012 2016 2012
Slovenia 9/2012–12/2012 Parliamentary 2011 2014 2012
Spain 1/2013–5/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2013
Sweden 10/2012–5/2013 Parliamentary 2010 2014 2012
Switzerland 9/2012–4/2013 Parliamentary 2011 2015 2012
Ukraine 7/2013–8/2013 Parliamentary 2012 2014 2013
United Kingdom 9/2012–2/2013 Parliamentary 2010 2015 2012
Asian Barometer survey round 3
Japan 11/2011–12/2011 Parliamentary 2009 2012 2011
South Korea 5/2011 Presidential 2007 2012 2011
Mongolia 4/2010–5/2010 Parliamentary 2008 2012 2010
Philippines 3/2010 General 2004 (pres.) 10/5/2010 2009
Taiwan 1/2010–2/2010 Parliamentary 2008 2012 2010
Indonesia 5/2011–6/2011 Presidential 2009 2014 2011
Latinobarómetro round 2013
Argentina 6/2013 Presidential 2011 2015 2012a
Bolivia 6/2013–7/2013 General 2009 2014 2013
Brazil 6/2013–7/2013 General 2010 2014 2013
Chile 5/2013–7/2013 General 2009 17/11/2013 2012
Colombia 6/2013 Presidential 2010 2014 2013
Costa Rica 6/2013–7/2013 General 2010 2014 2013
Dominican 
Republic
6/2013–7/2013 General 2012 2016 2013
Ecuador 6/2013 General 17/3/2013 2017 2013
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number of sociodemographic variables: subjective social status, level of education (recoded 
into none, primary, secondary, tertiary), gender, and age. Table A-1 documents question 
wordings for all variables and Table A-2 details the descriptive statistics. All analyses 
are conducted as multi-level structural equation models. As this paper is interested only 
in individual- and cross-level effects, the empirical models include no system-level con-
trol variables other than the moderating variable electoral integrity: The multi-level nature 
of the models already separates the individual- from the system-level variance, thereby 
rendering any system-level control variables unnecessary for analyses of individual- and 
cross-level effects (Leyland and Groenewegen 2020, pp. 116–117).
4  Results
The analysis proceeds in three steps. In a first step, multi-level structural equation models 
(cf. Meuleman 2019) analyze the overall effect of voting for the losing party or candidate, 
controlling for alternative explanations (see above; Model 1) and, additionally, for percep-
tions of electoral fairness and satisfaction with the incumbent government (Model 2). A 
second step includes the mediations of the loser effect via perceptions of electoral fairness 
and government satisfaction (Model 3). A third and final step tests for the conditionality 
of the mediation effect by incorporating the cross-level interaction with electoral integ-
rity (Model 4). For each of these multi-level structural equation models, the measurement 
model of political trust is estimated dynamically. Factor loadings are always fixed to be 
equal across countries. The baseline measurement model, i.e. the unconstrained multi-level 
CFA model (Model 0a), is presented in Table A-4 in the Online Appendix. Constraining 
the factor loadings to be equal across levels (metric isomorphism; Model 0b in Table A-4) 
significantly reduces model fit and inflates the SRMR (between) beyond acceptable values. 
The models used in the multi-level SEM analyses therefore do not assume metric isomor-
phism. Table A-5 in the Online Appendix presents the resulting measurement models for 
each of these models 1 to 4.5
Table 2  (continued)
Fieldwork period Election type Previous election Next election Matching year
El Salvador 6/2013 Presidential 2009 2014 2013
Guatemala 6/2013–7/2013 General 2011 2015 2013
Mexico 6/2013 General 2012 2018 2013
Panama 6/2013–7/2013 General 2009 2014 2013
Paraguay 6/2013 General 21/4/2013 2018 2013
Peru 6/2013 General 2011 2016 2013
Uruguay 6/2013 General 2009 2014 2013
Countries in italics are excluded because elections were held during survey fieldwork period. a Argentina 
held national legislative elections on 27.10.2013
5 For Model 1, the factor loadings for trust in the police as well as trust in courts on the individual level 
decrease compared to the baseline Model 0a, indicating that the trust items do not correlate only through 
the “political trust” factor but also through (some) of the covariates included in Models 1 to 4. There is vir-
tually no change in factor loadings from Models 2 to 4. There is also some change in factor loadings on the 
system level, which is negligible for the analyses presented here.
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Turning to the substantive analysis of how political losing affects political trust, Table 3 
presents the results of the analysis.6 It shows that, in the basic model, political losing 
decreases political trust (Model 1). All control variables affect political trust as we would 
have expected from the literature: economic performance evaluations, political interest, 
social trust, and socioeconomic status all increase political trust, while education tends to 
decrease it. Women are slightly more trusting than men. The effects of all control vari-
ables remain stable across model specifications. In contrast, the effect of political losing 
on political trust disappears as soon as controlling for perceptions of electoral fairness and 
satisfaction with the incumbent government (Model 2). The latter finding substantiates the 
idea that, contrary to much of the previous literature, political losing does not actually have 
a direct effect on political trust.
Instead, political losing appears to affect political trust indirectly. Model 3 in Table 3 
includes both the mediated effect via perceptions of electoral fairness and the mediated 
effect via satisfaction with the incumbent government. Both of these indirect effects are 
negative and statistically significant. Those who have voted for a candidate or party that did 
not become part of the government (coalition) tend to perceive the elections to have been 
less free and fair than those who voted for the winning camp and, subsequently, express 
less trust in the political system’s institutions (Fig. 2, upper path). In addition, those who 
voted for the losing camp are also less satisfied with the incumbent government and this 
in turn, again, results in lower levels of institutional trust (Fig. 2, lower path). Summing 
up those two indirect effects (− 0.87 through perceptions of electoral fairness and − 4.47 
through satisfaction with the incumbent government) gives us a total indirect effect of 
− 5.34. This means that being an election loser reduces political trust by about 5 points on 
a 100-point scale, or about 5 percent.7 The majority of this effect (around 80%) is mediated 
by government satisfaction, while the path via perceptions of electoral fairness accounts for 
around 20 percent of the total indirect effect. As both Model 3 in Table 3 and Fig. 2 dem-
onstrate, the indirect effects completely absorb the effect of losing: there is no direct effect 
remaining.
Model 4 in Table 3 finally includes the interaction term between losing the election and 
electoral integrity. This random-slope model allows the effect of political losing to vary 
between countries.8 As the theoretical argument suggested the level of electoral integrity 
to affect primarily the first part of the mediated effect, i.e. the effect political losing has on 
perceptions of electoral fairness, this is the interaction effect reported in Model 4  (i1). The 
results lend support to hypothesis 3: the effect of losing becomes smaller with increasing 
levels of electoral integrity. For ease of interpretation, Fig. 3 plots the conditional effect of 
6 All models are estimated as multi-level models. Models 1–3 in Table  3 are random-intercept models, 
while Model 4 is a random-slope model. Table 3 reports only  r2 (within) since Models 1–3 do not contain 
any level-2 predictors, so the  r2 (between) is 0. For the random-slope Model 4, neither  r2 (within) nor  r2 
(between) can be computed using maximum likelihood estimation.
7 This is about a quarter of the effect government satisfaction and economic performance evaluations, 
by far the strongest predictors, have on political trust. While this does not seem like much, we must keep 
in mind that both government satisfaction and economic performance evaluations are measured on 4- or 
5-point scales and their unstandardized regression coefficients therefore express the change in political trust 
following a change from one extreme (i.e. complete dissatisfaction) to the other (i.e. complete satisfaction). 
In addition, small effect sizes are not uncommon in research on political trust, as evidenced by the similar 
effect sizes for other prominent individual-level explanatory factors like political interest and social trust.
8 For reasons of parsimony, Models 1–3 did not include random slopes as the corresponding hypotheses 
 H1 and  H2 were not interested in between-country differences in effects. For comparison, Model 4_0 (Table 
A-6 in the Online Appendix) presents the random-slope model without any interaction effects.
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voting for the losing party or candidate on perceptions of electoral fairness. Like Model 
4 in Table 3 it clearly shows the decrease in effect strength for higher levels of electoral 
integrity: the effect is about three times as large in countries where electoral integrity is 
Fig. 2  Indirect effects of political losing on political trust. Sources: Asian Barometer 2010–2012; European 
Social Survey 2012–2013; Latinobarómetro 2013; V-Dem v9
Fig. 3  The conditional effect of political losing on perceptions of electoral fairness. Sources: Asian Barom-
eter 2010–2012; European Social Survey 2012–2013; Latinobarómetro 2013; V-Dem v9
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lacking than in those where electoral integrity is high (as measured by V-Dem).9 Conse-
quently, and as the full moderated mediation effect  i1*b1 in Model 4 (Table 3) evidences, 
the effect of political losing on political trust is also contingent on the level of electoral 
integrity. Apparently, losing the election becomes less important for how citizens view the 
quality of the electoral process and, ultimately, how much they trust their democratic insti-
tutions, in conditions where this electoral process is generally free and fair. In contrast, los-
ing the election makes people considerably more distrustful in conditions where the elec-
toral process does actually exhibit at least some flaws.
As expected, this is not the case when looking at the effect political losing has on sat-
isfaction with the incumbent government: regardless of whether electoral integrity is high 
or low, having voted for the losing camp always has an equally negative effect on how 
satisfied citizens are with the incumbent government (cf. Table A-7 and Figure A-1 in the 
Online Appendix).
5  Conclusion
This contribution set out to explore how electoral integrity shapes how election results are 
translated into citizen attitudes towards the political system. Specifically, it asked how the 
effects of political losing on political trust varied between countries with high levels of 
electoral integrity and countries with low levels of electoral integrity. Building on the idea 
that seeing their own preferred party or candidate lose the election may, one, result in lower 
satisfaction with the incumbent government and, two, make citizens view the electoral pro-
cess as less free and fair, it suggested that political losing decreases political trust indirectly 
through government satisfaction and perceptions of electoral fairness. It further argued that 
citizens are less likely to perceive the electoral process as flawed in conditions of high elec-
toral integrity, i.e. when the electoral process is in fact free and fair. Adding to the literature 
on political losing and political trust, it posited that this should mitigate the negative effect 
political losing has on perceptions of electoral fairness and, subsequently, on political trust, 
but not on satisfaction with the incumbent government.
Based on a dataset of ex-post harmonized survey data from three cross-national survey 
projects (Asian Barometer Survey, European Social Survey, Latinobarómetro) and macro-
level data from the Varieties-of-Democracy Project that covers 45 contemporary democra-
cies in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, it demonstrated that citizens who voted for 
the losing party or candidate indeed express less trust in the political system’s institutions. 
Yet, this link between election results and political trust appears to be entirely mediated 
through, on the one hand, satisfaction with the incumbent government and, on the other 
hand, perceptions of electoral fairness. Those who voted for the losing camp are both less 
satisfied with the incumbent government and view the electoral process as having been less 
free and fair than those who voted for the winning camp. Reduced satisfaction with the 
incumbent government and more negative views of the electoral process both in turn result 
in lower levels of political trust. Political losing thus seems to affect political trust only 
indirectly. With regard to the question how electoral integrity conditions this relationship 
between election results and political trust, this contribution’s core finding is that the gap 
9 We should, however, take into account that—as the analysis includes only democracies—there are few 
cases where electoral integrity reaches values close to the lower end of the scale. The lowest value recorded 
in the dataset is 0.37, and about half of the cases registers values for electoral integrity above 0.9.
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in how losers and winners perceive the electoral process becomes smaller when electoral 
integrity increases. Apparently, political losing primarily fosters doubts about the fairness 
of the electoral process in conditions when there is at least some reason to suspect viola-
tions of electoral integrity. As long as elections are conducted in a relatively free and fair 
manner (as assessed by V-Dem), in contrast, whether citizens win or lose in the election is 
hardly relevant for how they view the fairness of the electoral process.
These findings have important implications for democracies like Albania, Guatemala, 
or Mongolia, which all exhibit noticeable deficits in electoral integrity. Unlike democra-
cies with high electoral integrity like Chile, Portugal, and Japan, they cannot build on the 
famous “losers’ consent” (Anderson et al. 2005) with regard to citizens’ view of the elec-
toral process. While losing an election leads to citizens being less satisfied with the incum-
bent government and, at least to some extent, subsequently the political institutions ruled 
by this government, in any democracy, it is only the former democracies—those where 
electoral integrity is challenged—where losing an election additionally reduces institu-
tional trust by severely diminishing confidence in the electoral process itself. Safeguarding 
elections from manipulation attempts and irregularities can thus help shield democracies 
from election-related fluctuations in citizen support.
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